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Conflicts undermine forest-based livelihoods for the rural poor. Conflict management
is key to preventing such conflicts. This article analyzes actor perceptions of forest-
and tree-related conflicts and conflict management in Ghana’s high forest zone. It
also assesses a phased methodology that promotes shared problem definition and
ownership of recommendations on conflict resolution strategies through the presen-
tation and discussion of findings from document analysis, surveys, interviews, and
focus-group discussions at a workshop with forest professionals held in Kumasi,
Ghana. The study found that conflicts are inherent in forest-based livelihoods due
to policy and legislative failures and institutional deficiencies, perceived goal incom-
patibility, opportunities for interfering with the attainment of one another’s goals,
and environmental scarcity. Ongoing forest governance reforms in Ghana should con-
sider the stepwise conflict management model developed by the workshop participants
involved in this study, but expand it to include the views of other stakeholder groups.
Keywords conflict, conflict management, forest governance, forest- and tree-
based livelihoods, Ghana, high forest zone
Forest and tree conflicts and a lack of adequate conflict management present
challenges to forest governance and sustainable forest management (Ostrom 1999;
Yasmi 2007). In Ghana this has been investigated mainly in relation to timber
Received 27 May 2011; accepted 4 February 2013.
Address correspondence to Mercy Derkyi, School of Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Management, University of Energy and Natural Resources, P.O. Box 214, Sunyani,
Ghana. E-mail: afuaderkyi@yahoo.com; mercy.derkyi@uenr.edu.gh
Society and Natural Resources, 0:1–18
Copyright # 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0894-1920 print=1521-0723 online
DOI: 10.1080/08941920.2013.861550
1
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
it L
eid
en
 / L
UM
C]
 at
 00
:45
 07
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
14
 
(Kotey et al. 1998; Amanor 2000; Marfo 2006), despite a lot of fighting over other
forest resources. Dealing with conflicts effectively requires a shared problem
definition and an in-depth understanding of conflicts over common pool resources
(Adams et al. 2003). Against this background, the threefold objective of this article
is to (1) analyze conflicts beyond the timber sector through a holistic approach that
covers all forest-related livelihood activities that are subject to conflicts, (2) analyze
conflict management and its challenges from different actor perspectives, and (3)
assess a phased methodology that promotes a shared definition of problems and
solutions among government officials, resource managers, and experts—together
denoted as forest professionals1 in the rest of this article. The question addressed
is, ‘‘What are the perspectives of actors in Ghana’s forest sector regarding forest
and tree-related livelihood conflicts and conflict management options and what
methodology can be used to promote a shared understanding thereof?’’
After clarifying the main concepts used in this study and positioning this
article in the conflict literature, the political context, study area, and methodology
are elucidated. Next, the results are presented regarding actors’ understanding of
forest- and tree-based livelihood conflicts and conflict management options. The
discussion relates the findings to theory and reflects on the implications for practice.
The article concludes with recommendations.
Conflict Analysis and Management from a Theoretical Perspective
Conflicts are conceived in this article as incompatibilities in stakeholders’ interests,
values or priorities (Adams et al. 2003, 1916). Conflicts have various dimensions,
including context, issues, actors, causes, dynamics, and conflict resolution strategies
(Mason and Rychard 2005; Derkyi 2012). Regarding context, in Ghana it is impor-
tant to distinguish between different forest management regimes in forest reserves
and off-reserve areas. With regard to causes, Pondy (1967) refers to antecedent
conditions (e.g., resource scarcity) that are particularly important in the latent stage
preceding a conflict episode. Subsequent stages are an emerging stage in which one
of the parties perceives a conflict and a stage of manifest conflict in which the parties
behave in a way that makes the conflict observable (Pondy 1967; Tosi et al. 2000;
Engel and Korf 2005). Finally, the aftermath stage (Pondy 1967; Tosi et al. 2000)
reveals the consequences of conflicts, which can turn into new antecedent conditions
if they remain unresolved (Pondy 1967). Dynamics vary with conflict stage, poten-
tially culminating in violence (Engel and Korf 2005). This article clarifies antecedent
conditions, manifest behavior, and consequences for several conflict types and
contexts in Ghana’s high forest zone.
Conflict management is needed to prevent conflicts from escalating (Buckles and
Rusnak 1999; Yasmi 2007). It is used in this article for a process geared toward find-
ing mutually satisfying outcomes for two or more conflicted parties. This article uses
an adapted version of Moore’s (2003) continuum of conflict management strategies,
drawing from Engel and Korf (2005).2 Consensual approaches on this continuum
(negotiation, mediation) are more likely to lead to win–win outcomes than the
nonconsensual ones (avoidance, arbitration, adjudication, and coercion) and are
therefore generally preferred (Engel and Korf 2005). A third party (mediator)
capable of helping parties examine their interests and needs, negotiate an exchange
of viewpoints, or redefine their relationship in a way that is mutually satisfactory
plays an important role in such approaches (Moore 2003).
2 M. Derkyi et al.
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Despite the desire for win–win outcomes, forest conflicts are still widespread.
According to Adams et al. (2003), this is largely attributable to the fact that stake-
holders with different knowledge, understandings, values, and interests tend to frame
conflicts and possible solutions differently. A methodology that promotes a shared
problem analysis as outlined in this article is therefore of utmost relevance to achiev-
ing a dialogue. However, such a dialogue should go beyond forest professionals and
include stakeholders from local communities, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and timber operators.
Political Context
Forest conflicts in Ghana go back to the 1920s when forested lands were forcibly
included in the forest reservation process. The colonial government gave chiefs the
power to control land, natural resources, and labor services. Local people lost out
as they were excluded from land that they could otherwise have used for agriculture
or from negotiations about timber concessions (Amanor 2005, 17). However, those
who brought the traditional leaders into power as resource managers also took away
their right to negotiate timber concessions on stool lands3 under their jurisdiction.
Hence the current duality in the governance of Ghana’s natural resources, with own-
ership of land being vested in the stool and jurisdiction over forest resources being
vested in the state. The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) and
the Forestry Commission (FC) with its Forest Services Division (FSD), Wildlife
Division (WD) and Resource Management Support Centre (RMSC) are responsible
for the formulation and implementation of forest policies and regulations.
The 1994 Forest and Wildlife policy sought to promote collaboration and active
involvement of stakeholders in forest governance. Nevertheless, forest- and tree-
related conflicts remained widespread and preventive and mitigation measures were
too weak to minimize them. Patrolling by forest guards was one means of preventing
illegal encroachment and associated conflicts, but the intensity was decreased during
institutional reform of the then Forestry Department.4 Several regulations, such as
Act 617, LI 1649, and Social Responsibility Agreement (SRA5) guidelines, state
how disputes must be resolved. However, legislation favors the timber industry in
that it promotes negotiation in confrontations between the FC and timber operators,
but Forest Protection (Amendment) Act 624 (Ghana Law, Act of Republic, 2002)
prescribes immediate court action (fines or imprisonment) for community members
who access forest resources illegally.
The Forest Protection NRCD 243 (Ghana Law, NRC Decree, 1972) stipulates
that community rights include continued inhabiting of ‘‘admitted villages’’ and cul-
tivation in ‘‘admitted farms’’ that people occupied or used before their designation as
a reserve. The law also recognizes communal rights, including hunting rights,
footpaths to water sources, and the right to collect leaves, snails, chew-sticks, and
other nontimber forest products (NTFPs) for domestic use.
Study Area
The high forest zone in southwest Ghana (Figure 1) covers about one-third of
Ghana’s land area (approximately 7.5 million ha). It contains 204 gazetted forest
reserves spread over vegetation zones ranging from wet evergreen to dry semi-
deciduous forests (Hall and Swaine 1976).
Fighting Over Forest in Ghana 3
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The forest reserves comprise production, plantations, and protection forests.
In production forests the exploitation of timber and NTFPs is allowed with the
permission of the FC. Forest plantations are established in degraded areas assigned
to that end mainly for wood production. Protected forests are exempted from timber
exploitation and encompass fragile ecosystems like hill and swamp sanctuaries and
areas of special biological and cultural interest (Hawthorne and Abu-Juam 1995).
Areas outside forest reserves are referred to as off-reserve areas. Forest fringe
communities are made up of a mixture of migrant settlers from other regions of
Ghana and autochthonous population.
Methodology
Data Collection
This study employed a phased methodology aimed at achieving a shared conflict and
solution analysis among forest professionals. This initial focus was justified with a
view to generating consensus among those who bear primary responsibility for forest
governance. The first stage involved a literature review, policy analysis, and informal
interviews with key persons in the forest sector to identify relevant conflict issues.
Next, self-completed semistructured questionnaires were administered between
March and June 2009 among 30 policymakers and resource managers, including
officials from the MLNR and FC (headquarters, FSD at regional and district level,
and RMSC). Eleven respondents returned the questionnaire, including forest guards,
technical officers, district managers, and regional managers. To increase the number
and representativeness of actors especially from the MLNR and FC headquarters,
the third step entailed additional face-to-face interviews with deliberately selected
Figure 1. Study area (from Derkyi 2012).
4 M. Derkyi et al.
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respondents, using the same questionnaire. This increased the number of respondents
to n¼ 15. The items in the questionnaire related to actors’ understanding of the term
forest conflict and the six conflict dimensions distinguished in the theoretical framework.
In order to compensate for the low response rate and to ensure triangulation, the
fourth step involved a workshop in Kumasi in February 2010 at which the results of
the survey were presented and a focus-group discussion was held to validate and
synthesize the findings. The 25 workshop participants included forest professionals
affiliated to Ghanaian and international research institutions such as Kwame
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), the Forestry Research
Institute of Ghana (FORIG), Tropenbos International (TBI) Ghana, and the
International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR). Participants used the
opportunity to develop a stepwise conflict management model (Figure 2) to address
three core conflict types prevalent in Ghana’s forest estate.
To assess the validity of the forest professionals’ conflict analysis and conflict
management model, this article compares their views with those of other major
forest stakeholder groups by drawing from data collected among timber operators
and local farmers and community-based organizations between 2008 and 2010 in
the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve (Ashanti Region).6 A focus-group discussion was
held in November 2008 with four of the seven timber operators active in this area
on forest conflicts they encounter during their operations and the various ways of
overcoming them. Data on community perceptions of forest conflict dimensions
were collected through a survey among 331 randomly selected inhabitants of villages
representative of the various management regimes. These include Chirayaso
(n¼ 103) and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 (n¼ 109), both of which present
a production and plantation management regime. The latter occurs under the modi-
fied taungya system (MTS), which is a co-management arrangement between the FC
and communities in which farmers are allowed to plant food crops between the tree
seedlings until canopy closure and share in timber benefits when trees are harvested
(Ros-Tonen et al. 2013). Kyekyewere (n¼ 119), located in the middle of the reserve,
represents a protection regime. Data were also gathered in an off-reserve village, but
excluded from the analysis in this article as no conflicts were reported. In February
2010 meetings were organized in all study villages to validate the findings on com-
munity perceptions of forest conflicts. In June 2012 additional interviews were held
with representatives of the Domestic Lumber Trade Association (DOLTA) and three
NGOs that are active in the study area. These were New Generation Concern, the
Sunyani Forest Forum, and the Rural Development and Youth Association
(RUDEYA). All these are members of Forest Watch Ghana, which is a coalition
of 23 NGOs campaigning for sustainable and just forest management and biodiver-
sity conservation. The interviews centered on the aforementioned six dimensions of
forest conflicts and on ways of improving conflict management strategies.
Data Analysis
The survey and interview data were coded and analyzed using Statistical Package
for Social Sciences. MS Excel was used for a descriptive analysis of the views of
respondents. Both analyses focused on the abovementioned six conflict dimensions.
Three variables—antecedent conditions, manifest behavior, and consequences—
were used to represent latent, manifest, and aftermath conflict stages, respectively
(Pondy 1967; Engel and Korf 2005) (provided in Tables 1 and 2). Outputs of the
Fighting Over Forest in Ghana 5
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workshop with forest professionals, the focus-group discussion with timber opera-
tors, the validation meetings in the villages, and the interviews with NGO represen-
tatives were content analyzed to extract the views of the respective actors. The
conflict management strategies mentioned by the respondents were categorized using
Engel and Korf’s (2005) version of Moore’s conflict management continuum (see
Table 3). Document analysis (literature, policy documents, laws, meeting minutes,
etc.) provided secondary data and contextual information on forest conflicts.
Results
Perceptions of Forest and Tree Conflicts
Forest Officials
A shared definition of conflicts adopted at the workshop was ‘‘perceived or actual
opposing or competing needs, values and interests between two or more parties
related to the allocation, access, ownership or utilization of a resource.’’
Conflicts were classified according to their context. Conflicts in on-reserve
forests evolve around (1) illegality issues, (2) the allocation and use of forestland
for plantation development under the MTS, and (3) competing land uses (e.g.,
conservation vs. productive uses and forestry vs. farming or mining). The main
actors on the enforcement side are FSD field staff sometimes assisted by the Ghana
police and the military on patrol duties. Their major opponents are chainsaw millers
(those engaged in the legally prohibited on-site conversion of logs into sawn wood
for commercial purposes using chainsaws) (Marfo 2010) and illegal loggers (those
who remove trees without a Timber Utilization Contract or Timber Utilization
Permit), farmers (taungya farmers, illegal farmers, and those expanding admitted
farms illegally), hunters, and people extracting NTFPs for the market without
permits. Conflicts over the allocation of MTS plots evolve mainly between taungya
leaders and other participants. Conflicts on competing land uses involve farmers
among themselves (boundary conflicts) or versus timber operators (both legal and
illegal) and Fulani herdsmen (about crop damage). Competing claims also result
from the incompatibility between biodiversity conservation in strictly protected
‘‘Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas’’ and resource use, potentially creating
conflicts between the FC and inhabitants of protected areas, NTFP traders, farmers,
and miners (Derkyi et al. 2013). Conflicts in off-reserve areas include those between
(1) timber operators and farmers about inadequate compensation for crops damaged
during logging, (2) the FSD and tree-growing farmers about administrative lapses in
obtaining permits to harvest trees planted on-farm, (3) farmers=timber operators and
the FSD about the felling of nurtured trees on farms, and (4) farmers and pastoral-
ists about compensation for crop destruction by grazing animals. Conflicts in both
on-reserve and off-reserve areas include those between timber operators and
communities or between community elites and other community members over the
SRA, or concern timber operators in conflict with the FC about illegal operations,
with farmers about crop damage, or with chainsaw millers about competing claims
on timber. Forest professionals’ views of antecedent conditions, manifest behavior,
and consequences of these conflicts are presented in Table 1.
Timber Operators
Timber operators mentioned negotiations about the SRA and compensation for
destroying farm produce during logging as the main conflict issues. They identified
6 M. Derkyi et al.
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Table 1. Forest professionals’ perspectives of antecedent conditions, manifest
behavior, and consequences of forest- and tree-related conflicts
Conflict type
Antecedent
conditions Manifest behavior Consequences
Chainsaw milling
and illegal
logging in forest
reserves
. Financial greed
. Inadequate FC
front-line staff
and logistics
. Lack of political
will to enforce
forest laws and
stringent rules
. Logging without
permit
. Chainsaw milling
. Rent seeking by
officials
. Excessive
exploitation of
timber
. Hostility
between FSD
officials and
illegal loggers=
chainsaw
millers
Illegal logging in
off-reserve areas
. Absence of a
timber
benefit-sharing
arrangement for
farmers who
nurture timber
trees on farmlands
. Irritation among
farmers about
lack of benefits
resulting in
destruction of
seedlings
. Deals with
chainsaw millers
to fell trees on
farmland
. Unsustainable
and inefficient
timber
exploitation
Competing claims
on timber
. Greed . Timber theft . Clashes among
(legal and
illegal) timber
operators
Harvesting planted
trees on farmland
. Bureaucratic
procedures for
harvesting and
selling permits
. Farmers fail to
adhere to the
procedures
. Conflict
between
farmers and
FSD officers
Crop damage
compensation
. Absence of
guidelines on crop
damage
compensation
. Limited pasture
land for animal
grazing
. Crop destruction
by loggers and
animals of
Fulani herdsmen
. Inadequate
compensation
payment for
farmers
. Tensions
between
farmers and
timber
operators=
Fulani
herdsmen
SRA negotiation . Absence of FC
officials in SRA
negotiations
. Hijack of the
SRA negotiation
process by
community elites
. Refusal of timber
operators to pay
. Injustice and
social conflict
(Continued )
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the failure of the FC to inform communities properly about these issues as the main
cause, together with low pricing of logs by saw millers and tree theft by chainsaw
operators. Saw millers control log prices, as they have more secure access to timber
resources thanks to larger concession areas and more security about renewal of their
timber utilization contracts (TUCs) after 5 years. Price negotiations cause delays in
timber operations and extend the period during which wages and rent for equipment
are to be paid and hence reduce the profit margins for timber operators. Timber theft
occurs because farmers make deals with illegal chainsaw operators to fell trees on the
lands given to contractors. As Ghanaian laws do not provide for benefit sharing by
farmers in the exploitation of naturally regenerated trees on their land, such deals
enable them to earn from the trees on their farmland.
Communities
Respondents (n¼ 331) from the three villages focus on conflicts over access to forest
resources related to chainsaw milling (n¼ 175; 53%), boundary conflicts (n¼ 115;
35%), the allocation of plots for plantation development under the MTS (n¼ 78;
24%), illegal extension of admitted farms (n¼ 58; 18%), other forms of illegal
farming in forest reserves (n¼ 21; 6%), NTFP extraction for commercial use without
Table 1. Continued
Conflict type
Antecedent
conditions Manifest behavior Consequences
Forest
encroachment
. Population
increase
. Farm land
scarcity
. Poor fertility of
farmlands
. Illegal farming
and extension of
admitted farms
in forest reserves
. Forest
degradation
Boundary conflicts . Unclear or
distorted
boundary markers
. Greed and
selfishness
. Encroachment of
forest reserve or
land of
neighbours
. Mistrust and
misunder-
standing
among farmers
Allocation and use
of MTS plots
. Farm land
scarcity
. Greed
. Inadequate
supervision by
FSD of MTS plot
allocation
. Disproportionate
allocation of
farm plots by
taungya leaders
. Tensions
between
taungya
leaders and
other MTS
farmers
NTFP extraction . Livelihood needs . Illegal
commercial
NTFP extraction
from forest
reserves
. Hostility
between FSD
staff and
extractors
Note. FC¼Forestry Commission; FSD¼Forest Services Division; MTS¼modified taungya
system; NTFP¼ nontimber forest product; SRA¼ Social Responsibility Agreement.
8 M. Derkyi et al.
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a permit (n¼ 52; 16%) and for domestic use (n¼ 11; 3%), hunting (n¼ 21; 6%),
SRA negotiations (n¼ 15; 5%), and crop damage compensation (n¼ 7; 2%). Chainsaw
milling conflicts arise because the legal ban on chainsaw milling, which has applied
since 1998, results in clashes with FSD field staff or FSD=military task force (56%)
and operators holding legal timber utilization contracts (15%). Chainsaw milling
conflicts occur among chainsaw millers themselves, who accuse each other of timber
and fuel theft (23%). Only 5% mentioned the involvement of local actors (farmers)
in chainsaw conflicts. Conflicts mainly involving local actors are those about farm
boundaries and MTS plot allocation (favoritism among taungya leaders and fees
charged). Conflicts about commercial NTFP extraction occur between forest guards
and NTFP collectors (traders and community members employed by them). Conflicts
regarding NTFP collection for domestic use rarely occur, but if they do they result
from forest guards requiring community members to seek their permission before
entering the reserve, despite legal provisions that allow NTFP extraction for domestic
use without a permit. Hunting conflicts involving hunters and forest guards mostly
occur during the closed season (August–December) when hunting is prohibited.
The community perspectives of antecedent conditions, manifest behavior and
consequences of these conflicts are presented in Table 2.
Nongovernmental Organizations
All NGO representatives mentioned negotiations about SRA and crop damage
compensation as the main sources of conflicts at community level, either between
local people and their leaders or between the community and timber operators. They
attribute the problem to leaders hijacking community benefits, unwillingness among
timber operators to compensate farmers adequately for logging damage, ignorance
about the arrangement at community level, and a lack of transparency and com-
munity involvement in the issuance of logging permits, which makes local people
suspicious of timber contractor’s operations. Conflicts relating to plantation develop-
ment (about wages to be paid by commercial plantation developers or uncertainty
about MTS plot allocation) and FSD field officers not respecting communal rights
to extract NTFPs for domestic use were also mentioned. Some NGO representatives
regarded the passive involvement of local people in policy formulation as an underly-
ing problem. They are only involved when their consent is needed and therefore ill-
informedor caught by surprisewhennewpolicies and regulations are imposedon them.
Perceptions of Conflict Management Strategies and Challenges
Forest Officials
Table 3 presents conflict management strategies mentioned by the respondents,
categorizing them on the basis of the adapted version of Moore’s (2003) continuum
of conflict management approaches.
The respondents see several challenges to these approaches. First, the coercion in
the administrative system has resulted in hostility between FSD officials and actors
engaging in forest offenses, apathy among the stakeholders regarding support for
forest management, or fighting and injuries. Second, contrary to the SRA guidelines,
the District Forest Manager or his=her representatives do not fulfill the roles of
witness and mediator during negotiation processes. This often results in disagree-
ments between the community and the timber contractor or within the community,
which may escalate into road blockades if not resolved on time. A third challenge
Fighting Over Forest in Ghana 9
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involves interference by politicians and elites during conflict resolution. Sometimes
these elites plead on behalf of the offenders, thereby preventing them from receiving
the necessary punishment. A final challenge is how to arrive at trade-offs that are
acceptable to all conflict parties involved.
The workshop participants proposed an integrated conflict management model
to deal with compensation and land-use-related conflicts, forest boundary conflicts
(including those over MTS plot allocation), and conflicts about illegal logging or
chainsaw milling (Figure 2). In the proposed model, the FC—which maintains close
links with traditional authorities—is the mediating actor that defines the steps that
can be taken to achieve a win-win outcome. Except for illegal logging, this begins
with negotiation among conflict parties, followed by third-party mediation (by
Table 3. Conflict management strategies in Ghana
Category
according to
Moore (2003)
Conflict type in
which it prevails Example
Conflict
avoidance
Chainsaw milling Chainsaw millers escape, leaving behind
the lumber and their working tools,
upon hearing of the presence of the
FSD=military patrol team in the area.
Negotiation SRA negotiations Timber contractor negotiates with
beneficiary communities about SRA.
Mediation SRA negotiations A District FSD officer, representative of
the local traditional authority, or
District Assembly mediates if direct
SRA negotiations fail.
Arbitration Illegal farming and
logging in forest
reserves
Committees of inquiry are established to
assess illegality cases in forest reserves
and present recommendations for
action.
Adjudication Legal and illegal
logging
Offenders sign affidavits in which they
pledge to desist from committing such
offenses again and pay fines for the
stolen forest products through
administrative means. However, some
are sent to court to be fined and=or
imprisoned.
Nonviolent
coercive
action
Chainsaw milling The FSD=military=police team arrests
illegal chainsaw operators and sends
them for prosecution.
Violent
coercive
action
Illegal farming
Chainsaw milling
The FSD=military=police team destroys
illegal farms or uses force in clashes
with chainsaw millers.
Violence occurs among chainsaw millers
in conflicts over log stealing.
Note. FSD¼Forest Services Division; SRA¼ Social Responsibility Agreement.
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FSD officials, traditional leaders, and=or a District Chief Executive) if this does
not lead to a resolution. If mediation fails, arbitration is the next step. In that case
a third party (e.g., the Land Valuation Division under the Lands Commission in the
event of conflicts over logging damage, or an arbitration team with representatives
from each conflict party in MTS plot allocation conflicts) decides how the conflict
should be settled. If these approaches fail, legal proceedings are the final step. Illegal
logging or chainsaw milling conflicts should be settled in court, but arbitration could
be used through administrative means by the FSD or through a pardon with bond7 if
the timber is intended for community development. Such a stepwise approach
worked for a conflict between farmers and MTS executives in Chirayaso about
the disproportionate allocation of plots to taungya leaders. Mediation had failed,
but all parties accepted the decisions by a field verification team consisting of
representatives of the conflict parties, the district FSD, and traditional authorities.
The taungya committee was replaced, additional land for plantation development
was allocated to the aggrieved parties, and a new rule was created entitling MTS execu-
tives to four plots instead of one because of their extra responsibilities (Derkyi 2012).
Timber Operators
Timber operators designated negotiation as the first means of dealing with conflicts
about SRAs and crop damage compensation, although sometimes mediation is
required by District Chief Executives, the FSD, and an opinion leader in the
community. Log pricing is best negotiated with prospective buyers before logging,
but since the logging process takes a long time, buyers often change the agreed price.
Coercive action (arrest by the FSD=military task force or the police) was indicated
as the only means of dealing with tree theft by chainsaw operators, although feasible
Figure 2. Integrated conflict management system (ICM) model designed by forest profes-
sionals (from workshop held in Kumasi, Ghana, February 2010). Note. ACR¼ alternative
conflict resolution; MoU¼memorandum of understanding.
12 M. Derkyi et al.
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only if the person is actually apprehended during the operation. The timber opera-
tors propose a more proactive role in conflict management for government agencies
(FC, District Chief Executives, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and the
MLNR). This includes educating both timber operators and local communities on
relevant forestry issues and the SRA, training farmers to grow trees on the farmland
boundaries rather than intermixing them with crops, and mediating in negotiations
between saw millers and timber contractors on the issue of log pricing.
Communities
Villagers mentioned negotiation, with or without mediation by chiefs and elders, as
the lead strategy for resolving conflicts on chainsaw milling, access to NTFPs for
domestic use, and hunting. Mediation by chiefs and elders also plays a role in
conflicts related to NTFP collection for commercial purposes, the allocation of
MTS plots, boundary conflicts, the theft of logs or fuel among chainsaw millers,
and disputes between hunters. Coercive action (the use of force) was reported for
all conflict types except those relating to the collection of NTFPs for domestic
use. Adjudication (arrest and fining of offenders, prosecuting them in law court
and confiscating their products) was mentioned mainly in relation to chainsaw
milling. Avoidance was said to be employed in all the conflict types except those
relating to NTFPs for domestic use.
At the community validation meetings, consensus was reached about the roles in
conflict management for actors at local and district levels:
. The FSD: awareness raising about forest issues, illegal operations and SRAs;
law enforcement; monitoring the implementation of the MTS; forest boundary
clearing.
. Chiefs and elders: advisory, educating, mediating, and monitoring roles.
. District Assembly (local arm of government): education and mediation in SRA
negotiations.
. Community-based institutions (Unit Committees and Community Biodiversity
Advisory Groups [CBAGs])8: collaborating with the FC and traditional authori-
ties in natural resource management, patrolling, education, advice, and conflict
settlement.
. Police and military: law enforcement.
Community members stressed the importance of avoiding bribery and favoritism in
law enforcement and settling disputes and preventing the prolongation of court
cases, which discourages people from sending cases to court.
Nongovernmental Organizations
NGO representatives stressed that most community-level conflicts involving outside
actors do not end up in court, due to the frequent adjournment of court hearings,
financial constraints, weak capacity to articulate the grievances, and favoritism toward
timber operators. Court decisions favorable to communities are often circumvented due
to elite interference. Notably, RUDEYA and the Sunyani Forestry Forum therefore
focus on establishing community forums to empower people and to make them
aware of policies and their rights, and organize workshops for timber operators and
saw millers to raise awareness of their responsibilities toward the communities. They
recommend that the FC improve information flows and raise awareness at community
level, promote active community involvement in natural resource management, make
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inhabitants’ representation obligatory when timber operators and traditional leaders
sign SRAs, improve coordination with environmental NGOs, and support the concept
of community forums.
Discussion
The preceding analysis shows that forest conflicts in Ghana involve all forest- and
tree-based livelihoods and are rooted partly in colonial legacy. Conflicting interests
can be material and immaterial, for example, conservation aims versus livelihoods
needs (Adams et al. 2003; Ros-Tonen and Dietz 2005).
In line with the literature, all the actor groups acknowledge chainsaw milling as
the main source of forest conflicts. Remarkably, SRA negotiations and crop damage
compensation payments that rank high in literature and among most actor groups
are mentioned by only 5% and 2% of the community survey respondents. Underre-
porting of such conflicts may occur because community claims are not adequately
dealt with or because judgments are easily circumvented due to elite interference.
However, as no such conflicts were identified in the off-reserve site that was excluded
from the analysis in this article, SRA and compensation payment conflicts indeed
seem to be less prevalent in the study area compared to other regions. Access to
farmland and commercial extraction of NTFPs are greater concerns at community
level, resulting in conflicts with FSD officials, other farmers, and MTS executives.
The antecedent conditions in Tables 1 and 2 relate to conflict literature in differ-
ent ways. Forest professionals are biased toward the violation of forest laws and
refer primarily to factors identified by Tyler (1999) as important sources of natural
resource conflicts, namely, lapses in public policy and institutional failures, lack of
political will, deficient financial means, and elite pressure. A second group of factors
relates to Homer-Dixon’s (1994) environmental scarcity concept: the combined out-
come of population growth, the resulting pressure on natural resources and farming
land, environmental change (deforestation), and unequal social distribution of
resources. Finally, some antecedent conditions refer to Schmidt and Kochan’s
(1972) ‘‘perceived goal incompatibility’’ and the ‘‘perceived opportunity for inter-
fering with the attainment of one another’s goals.’’ In contrast, community members
refer primarily to economic hardship and their need for food, tools, medicinal plants,
and income, which compete with the needs and greed of others and laws that limit
their access to forest resources. This basically relates to Schmidt and Kochan’s ‘‘per-
ceived goal incompatibility’’ combined with Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity
as underlying conflict causes. Community livelihood needs feature marginally in the
conflict analysis by forest officials, whereas NGO and timber sector representatives
relate them primarily to SRA and compensation payments but not, or much less, to
farming land and NTFPs.
All conflict management strategies from Moore’s (2003) conflict management
continuum are currently being applied in Ghana’s high forest zone, but they are
poorly institutionalized. Conflict management operates within the national legal sys-
tem, the collaborative system, and the customary system (cf. Engel and Korf 2005).
It is often assumed that the latter does not play a functional role in Ghana’s forest
sector, as legislation has turned traditional authorities into passive and marginalized
recipients of insignificant and irregular shares of revenue, with no formal decision-
making roles in any aspect of forest and conflict management despite their legal
position as resource owners (Mayers and Kotey 1996). However, the findings
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revealed that customary institutions play a greater role in forest conflict management
at local level than generally acknowledged.
The overall preference for win–win outcomes based on negotiation and
mediation implies an important role for third-party mediation. The workshop part-
icipants proposed a conflict management model based on collaboration between the
FC and traditional authorities. However, NGOs believe they can fulfill an important
role in empowering communities and lobbying for the effective handling of com-
munity claims in court, based on their perception that chainsaw milling, SRA, and
crop damage compensation are the major conflict issues. However, none of the other
stakeholders explicitly mentioned a role for NGOs in conflict management. Timber
operators refer exclusively to statutory government agencies (the FC, District
Chief Executives, ministries) in informing stakeholders about SRA regulations and
forestry issues, promoting tree-planting practices that minimize logging damage,
and mediation in wood pricing. Community members assign an important role to
the FC, but also stress the importance of collaboration with traditional
authorities and community-based institutions. The central role assigned by most sta-
keholders to the FC as a mediator can be explained by the prevalence of hierarchical
governance in Ghana (Derkyi 2012), resulting in a dependent relationship with
government agencies (Insaidoo et al. 2012). As hierarchical relationships also prevail
in customary governance, there is a role to be played by the FC or NGOs as watch-
dogs of interests of community members in SRA negotiations and MTS plot allo-
cation: processes that are sometimes hijacked by chiefs and MTS executives,
respectively. Moreover, all actor groups emphasize ‘‘education’’ (awareness raising
and improving information flows) as important means of conflict prevention, with
a role for the FC, traditional authorities, District Assemblies, and community-based
organizations.
Conclusions
By addressing the question of what the perspectives are of various stakeholder groups
of forest and tree-related conflicts in Ghana, this article has shown that conflicts
are not only related to timber logging and chainsaw milling, as existing literature
suggests, but that they are inherent in all forest- and tree-based livelihoods. The forest
professionals involved in this study developed an integrated conflict management
model based on a shared analysis of problems and potential solutions. This stepwise
conflict resolution approach involves close links between statutory and customary
institutions, prioritizes negotiation, and considers legal proceedings the last resort.
At first sight, a phased methodology that combined a survey and interviews with
a workshop to discuss and create consensus on the findings with those responsible
for forest governance seemed to be appropriate. It generated a comprehensive analysis
of prevailing conflicts and conflict management strategies, with good insights into
the motivations and frustrations of various stakeholders. However, including the
perspectives of other stakeholder groups revealed a bias toward conflicts resulting
from violations of forest laws and a downplaying of livelihood needs at community
level. The perspectives of other stakeholder groups generated a deeper insight into
specific conflict issues and the drivers behind them. For the conflict management
model designed by the workshop participants to function in practice, it is therefore
recommended that other stakeholders’ suggestions be included and that (1) the
model be expanded to include preventive measures such as education and awareness
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raising among stakeholders by the FC, traditional authorities, District Assemblies,
and NGOs particularly concerning chainsaw milling, illegal logging, SRA negotia-
tions, and NTFP extraction, (2) a role is assigned to forestry forums that provide
a channel for various stakeholders to voice their grievances, (3) it is made explicit
how community-based organizations can be involved in policymaking and imple-
mentation, monitoring, and conflict management, and (4) the role for NGOs as
watchdogs of community interests against elite capture of benefits be institutionalized.
A more elaborated model, which is acceptable to all stakeholders involved, could then
be integrated into ongoing efforts to improve forest governance in Ghana such as the
Natural Resources Environment and Governance Programme (NREG), the Volun-
tary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union (EU) to combat illegal
logging, and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDDþ)
initiatives. Only then can conflicts in the forest sector be effectively addressed.
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Notes
1. In this article the term ‘‘forest professionals’’ refers to knowledgeable people with
experience in the forest sector, for example, researchers, consultants, retired government
officials, or staff of nongovernmental and international organizations.
2. Engel and Korf (2005) reduced the number of categories on Moore’s continuum by
incorporating informal discussion, administrative decisions, and judicial and legislative
decisions into negotiation, arbitration, and adjudication, respectively.
3. A stool (or in Northern Ghana: skin) is defined as any traditional authority (a chief or
traditional council) having control over community land, including family land, as
a representative of a particular community (Kasanga 2003, 144). With the consent of the
traditional authorities, stool lands were released to be constituted as forest reserves under
the jurisdiction of the Forestry Commission (Ollenu 1962; Derkyi 2012).
4. The Forestry Commission was established in 1999 by Act 571.
5. The SRA is a legally required payment by timber operators to the community of 5% of
the stumpage fees in cash or kind.
6. Due to their nomadic nature and sporadic presence in the study area, Fulani herders were
not included in the research.
7. Pardon with bond means that a community has to sign an affidavit not to fell trees for
timber without a permit from the FSD.
8. Unit Committees are elective bodies in Ghana’s local government system whose tasks
include the organization of communal labor, revenue raising, registration of births and
deaths, and the implementation and monitoring of self-help projects. CBAGs were created
by the FC with a view to engaging community members in forest resource management by
acting as social fences in the protection of Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas.
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